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Abstract 
This paper analyses conceptual and experimental work in synthetic biology on different types of 
interactions considered as minimal examples or models of communication. It discusses their pertinence 
and relevance for the wider understanding of this biological and cognitive phenomenon. It critically 
analyses their limits and it argues that a conceptual framework is needed.  As a possible solution, it 
provides a theoretical account of communication based on the notion of organisation, and characterised 
in terms of the functional influence exerted by the sender upon the receiver. It shows that this account 
can be operationalised in synthetic biology, and that it can supply criteria and guidelines for the design 
and evaluation of synthetic models.  
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Regulation; synthetic biology; minimal cognition; influence; organisation; biological functions; 
protocells. 
1. Introduction 
Synthetic biology is a very diversified domain of scientific activity, dedicated to the design, creation, and 
modification of biological systems and components for human purposes. This field of investigation is 
characterised by different approaches. They share a common methodological attitude that does not follow 
rigid protocols but resembles tinkering, and looks for satisficing solutions that work for specific purposes 
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[1, 2]. Much of synthetic biology pursues an approach close to that of engineering, focused on practical 
applications, and carried out by modifying and using biological material to perform specific tasks [3, 4]. 
An important part of the community, however, is also involved in developing a deeper understanding of 
the biological world. It pays special attention to minimal living systems, and to one of the great 
unanswered questions at the very roots of biology: the origins of life. This practice of knowledge, instead 
of studying living systems by analysing their parts or by formulating predictive models of their 
behaviours, aims to understand their functioning by actually constructing (usually a simplified version 
of) the object of investigation, and by studying the properties and behaviours it exhibits [5–7]. A mix of 
theoretical and heuristic considerations converge in this branch of synthetic biology to pursue this goal. 
The result is an operational approach where the contents of hypotheses, definitions, and conceptual 
frameworks can inspire research and be used, manipulated, and tested in the laboratory [8]. 
Biological properties are not the only targets of these two branches of synthetic biology. The last decade 
has been characterised by an increased interest in synthetic models of cognitive phenomena, whose goals 
vary from the study of minimal cognition and biological communication, to the exploration of the 
possible contributions of synthetic biology to research in artificial intelligence. The former line of 
investigation has been focusing on the design of sensory-effector mechanisms and on the study of 
interacting capabilities in protocells [9–12]. The latter has been pursued by focusing either on information 
technologies that realise computation through biochemical systems [13], or on embodied artificial 
intelligence grounded in biochemistry [14].  
One of the most promising lines of theoretical and experimental research in this area focuses on the 
phenomenon of biological communication. Communication is investigated by exploring the possibilities 
opened by the interactions between artificial and natural cells. The relatively recent recognition that life, 
even at the unicellular level, does not occur in isolation, but is characterised by collective phenomena, 
has already been put to work by synthetic biologists in the study of the origins of life [15–17]. Studying 
communication is particularly relevant in this context in order to understand the collective dimension of 
the (most basic) biological and cognitive world. For this reason, it has been the object of several 
conceptual and experimental works in synthetic biology [10–12, 18]. Moreover, synthetic models of 
communication have even been proposed and employed as evaluation tools for synthetic biology [19, 
20].  
The aims, scope, methodology, and conceptual foundations of this enterprise are still in course of 
definition. One of the main problems it faces is the lack of a precise conceptual framework applicable to 
synthetic biology, capable of capturing the distinctive character of communication and its differences 
from other types of cognitive interactions. A theoretical and epistemological analysis is needed, and this 
paper aims to provide it by addressing the conceptual issues underlying research in this area. The purpose 
is twofold. In the first place, it aims to discuss the scope and relevance of the synthetic models of 
communication available, besides and beyond their capability to realise successful interactions between 
protocells and natural cells. In the second place, the goal is to provide a precise theoretical framework to 
address the phenomenon of communication and to offer suggestions and guidelines to expand or re-orient 
the existing models, and to design new experiments.  
To do so, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual foundations of the synthetic 
modelling of cognitive phenomena. It introduces a theoretical framework for minimal cognition 
applicable at the level of organisation that is characteristic of the phenomena investigated by synthetic 
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biology. It also discusses the criteria to evaluate the relevance of interactive models in this field. In 
Section 3, three synthetic models of communication are analysed. Their virtues and limits in contributing 
to a deeper understanding of communicative phenomena in biology are discussed. Section 4 focuses on 
the general notion of biological communication and provides a theoretical account, based on the notion 
of influence and framed in organisational terms. The goal is to capture the distinctiveness of the 
phenomenon of communication with respect to other dimensions of minimal cognition, and to supply 
operational criteria for its investigation in synthetic biology. Finally, in Section 5, the implications of this 
framework for the evaluation and design of synthetic models are discussed.  
2. Requirements for the Study of Minimally Cognitive Phenomena through 
Synthetic Models  
Cognition is a wide and diversified biological phenomenon, closely related to, and often identified with, 
the adaptive interactions between organisms and their environments. However, not all cognitive 
phenomena have the same pertinence and practical relevance when the goal is to study the relationship 
between synthetic biology and cognitive science. For example, the debate on cognition in most cases is 
focused on the study of organisms with nervous systems. However, a characterisation of cognition in 
terms of properties of the nervous system would not be particularly useful for studying cognitive 
phenomena at the level of protocells and minimal cells. The choice of the domain of investigation, 
synthetic biology, strongly constrains the range of cognitive phenomena that can be studied and the types 
of properties that can be modelled. Moreover, the specificity of this field requires framing the theoretical 
question of cognition at a level that is relevant for synthetic approaches. Of interest in this context, in 
fact, is not the whole range of cognitive properties and phenomena, but only those minimal ones that are 
realised by means of biochemical and biomolecular mechanisms, and can be operationalised through 
synthetic models (e.g. protocells). Therefore, a theoretical account of minimal cognition as realised in 
basic living systems would be the most pertinent in this domain. 
A theoretical framework that is particularly relevant to the understanding of cognition in this specific 
scenario is the organisational one, based on the notion of autonomy [21–24]. It has often been applied in 
synthetic biology to investigate the origins of life and minimal life [25–27]. According to this approach, 
biological systems are organised in such a way that they are capable of self-producing and self-
maintaining while in constant interaction with the environment. This capability to viably interact with 
the environment has often been understood as minimally cognitive. Cognition has been characterised in 
terms of the interactions a living system can enter and the resulting modifications it can undergo without 
losing its identity [22, 28–31], without necessarily requiring the presence of a nervous system. Within 
this perspective, a theoretical account has been recently proposed by Bich and Moreno with the precise 
aim of tackling the issue of the origin and synthetic modelling of minimal cognition [32]. It focuses on 
the specific features of the minimal biochemical and biomolecular mechanisms underlying the cognitive 
capabilities of unicellular systems, such as, for example, chemotaxis and communication. The specific 
theoretical framework introduced in [32] has later been adopted to study minimal cognition not only in 
synthetic (protocells) and basic (prokaryotic) unicellular living systems, but also in eukaryotic organisms 
without nervous systems such as slime moulds, which can exhibit very complex behaviours [33]. 
The starting point of this approach is to focus on one of the essential aspects of cognition, that can be 
analysed at the minimal level of biological organisation. It consists in the fact that cognitive systems 
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should be able to distinguish between some specific features of their interaction with the environment, 
and to act accordingly, in such a way as to maintain their viability. This capability emerges when 
distinctions between different kinds of environmental perturbations make a difference for the organism, 
due to the role played by mechanisms of self-regulation [32]. 
Regulation, in this view, consists in the capability of living systems to selectively shift between different 
available regimes of self-maintenance in response to specific variations, due to the action of dedicated 
subsystems (specifically sensitive to these features) [34]. The crucial point is that in the presence of 
regulatory mechanisms the response of a system is the result of an evaluation of perturbations operated 
by the regulatory subsystems themselves (activation plus action). The latter modulate the constitutive 
dynamics of a system in such a way that the system as a whole becomes able to cope with the 
environmental perturbations that triggered the regulatory response in the first place: the organism 
metabolises a new source of food, changes direction of movement, secretes chemicals to neutralise a 
lethal substance, etc. By doing so, a regulatory subsystem establishes some categories in the environment 
(the variations that activate the regulatory mechanism). These categories are actually employed by the 
system to modify its own internal dynamics in a viable way (through the regulatory action). This 
capability can be considered cognitive in a minimal sense because in the presence of regulatory 
mechanisms, the environment becomes a source of specific and recognisable interactions for the system, 
and not only of indistinguishable perturbations (noise).  
This theoretical framework is particularly suitable for applications in synthetic biology. It accounts for 
cognition at the level of minimal living systems, and it does so in terms of biochemical and biomolecular 
regulatory mechanisms that can be implemented in protocells or semisynthetic cells. Specifically, it 
makes explicit two operational requirements for minimal cognition: (a) the realisation of biochemical or 
biomolecular sensory-effector regulatory mechanisms; and (b) the fact that the activity of these 
mechanisms should contribute to the overall maintenance and viability of the more comprehensive 
system that harbours and maintains them (e.g., the cell). The adoption of this theoretical approach, 
therefore, has important implications, as it narrows down the range of the interactive systems that are 
pertinent for investigating cognition and communication (requirement a), and that of the possible full-
fledged synthetic realisations that can be considered properly cognitive (requirement b). 
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Figure 1. Synthetic model of a sensory-effector biomolecular mechanism. A regulatory mechanism (a) is implemented in a 
protocell (b) by employing riboswitches that activate RNA transcription from DNA in the presence of a specific ligand [9 
reproduced by permission of The Royal Society of Chemistry]. 
At the same time, this approach makes explicit the type of abstractions that are necessary to realise more 
simplified synthetic models: that is, narrowing down the scope of the model in order to focus on specific 
minimal sensory-effector mechanisms, when the model system is a protocell that is not capable of self-
maintaining. An example of this latter approach is constituted by Martini and Mansy’s [9] protocells 
enclosing riboswitches (Figure 1). This experimental model shows how these protocells can sense 
specific molecules coming from the environment, and respond to them by triggering gene expression and 
RNA transcription. In this case, the possibilities opened by specific cognitive-like minimal mechanisms 
can be explored without incurring the current overwhelming difficulties of realising from the bottom up 
fully fledged autonomous systems harbouring self-maintaining metabolisms. 
Satisfying requirements a and b imposes strong constraints on the possible domains of realisation of 
minimally cognitive or cognitive-like systems. It narrows down the range of systems that are pertinent 
for realising and investigating cognition and communication to those with a biochemical basis. In doing 
so, this approach gives wetware-based models a more central role compared to hardware- and software-
based ones (see [32] for a more detailed discussion of this point). However, it does not commit to one 
specific biochemical basis, as far as the model systems realise self-maintenance in far from equilibrium 
conditions.  
As will be shown, the requirement of a biochemical basis – or of a domain of realisation that shares some 
of the properties of the biochemical one – holds not only for synthetic models of minimal cognition, but 
also for communication. The biological phenomenon of communication relies on cognitive capabilities. 
As will be shown in the next sections, communicative interactions too, as a subset of cognitive 
interactions, need to be characterised by taking into account how they are produced by biological systems 
(requirement a), and how they contribute to, or affect, the regime of self-maintenance of the biological 
systems involved in the interaction (requirement b).  
3. Synthetic Models of Communication 
Among the cognitive phenomena investigated by synthetic biology, biological communication stands out 
as the object of a thriving line of research, focused on the interactions between artificial (protocells) and 
natural cells. The main goals of this enterprise are technological and theoretical. The former goals are 
pursued through the study and implementation of mechanisms of targeted administration of molecules to 
living cells by means of protocells, and through the development of biochemical information 
technologies. This line of research is mainly aimed toward medical and industrial applications. The latter 
goals are related to the phenomenon of biological communication per se, and they are pursued by 
designing and realising synthetic models of biological intercellular interactions. This second line of 
research aims to provide insights into the nature and origin of minimal forms of biological 
communication and cognition by means of artificial systems.  
This second type of synthetic approach to communication is being pursued through a hybrid 
methodology, focused on the interaction between fully fledged minimally cognitive systems (natural 
cells) and artificial cognitive-like systems, such as, for example, the protocells with riboswitches 
described in Section 2. It is important to point out that when communication is the target of analysis, the 
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main focus of investigation is partly different from the case of individual cognition. The main goal is not 
only the design and study of viable relationships between a system and its medium (a source of 
perturbations) but, more importantly, the realisation of successful interactions between cognitive (and/or 
cognitive-like) systems.  
This approach to communication faces specific modelling challenges. In particular, it needs to conform 
to two types of criteria of relevance for synthetic models, as defined by Damiano and collaborators: 
phenomenological and organisational [6]. A synthetic model is phenomenologically relevant if it 
produces, according to explicit parameters, the same phenomenology as a living or cognitive system, 
regardless of the underlying mechanism, which can vary. In the case of cognition, a model is relevant at 
the phenomenological level if it produces the same behaviour as a cognitive system, or if it engages in 
similar interactive dynamics. A synthetic model is organisationally relevant if, according to a specific 
theory of life and/or cognition, it realises the same organisation as the living or cognitive system that is 
the object of investigation. In this case, the primary target is not the features of some phenomena or 
behaviours, but how they are generated.  
A synthetic approach to communication, considered as a dimension of cognition, needs to satisfy specific 
requirements. One of them consists in taking into account the self-regulatory mechanisms at the basis of 
minimal cognitive capabilities as exhibited by basic living systems (organisational relevance). Yet 
regulatory mechanisms alone are not enough, insofar as the target is not just adaptivity in a changing 
environment, but how minimally cognitive systems – that is, autonomous systems endowed with 
regulatory capabilities – are capable of adaptively interacting/communicating among themselves. 
Therefore, an external (inter-system) point of view is also required in order to take specifically into 
account the features of the interactions that minimally cognitive systems undergo among themselves 
without losing their viability, and how the consequent internal modifications affect the interactive 
dynamics themselves (phenomenological relevance). Synthetic models should capture this double 
dimension of communication, and therefore satisfy both organisational and phenomenological criteria of 
relevance. 
Let us consider three examples of synthetic approaches to communication. All employ some mechanism 
of signal exchanges and consequent activation of effector responses. The first example, from Suda et al. 
[18], focuses on communication by putting specific attention on the possibilities of applications at the 
molecular level. The starting idea is that molecular communication can be characterised as a five-step 
process of encoding, sending, propagating, receiving and decoding information. This process is not 
necessarily instantiated by cells but also by free artificial molecular devices. According to this view, 
molecules are energetically very efficient information carriers that, like in the case of ions, can activate 
membrane channels (intercellular communication), or be carried by molecular motors (intracellular 
communication), such as in the case of acetylcholine transport along the axon of a neuron. The process 
of communication starts when the sender produces and stores molecules (encoding), and then releases 
them (sending), for instance, when a certain concentration threshold is reached. These molecules are then 
propagated through the environment (passively in the medium, or actively by means of transport motors) 
from the sender to the receiver. Then, the receiving and decoding steps take place when the carrier 
molecules bind to the receiver (through a membrane receptor or a free molecule with structural 
compatibility with the carrier), and the receiver reacts by changing its behaviour or properties (e.g., by 
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This account of communication focuses primarily on molecular interactions per se, with the aim of 
developing nanomachines. It does not necessarily take into account how a more comprehensive 
biological or artificial system realises, harbours, maintains, and employs such molecular mechanisms to 
engage in communicative interactions. The reason lies in the fact that the goal of this approach is to 
develop chemical information technologies. The context in which the modelled interactions are 
characterised as communicative is that of human applications, rather than of interactive biological 
entities. In this scenario, it is the human user who employs these molecular mechanisms to realise 
biologically inspired and more efficient processes of human communication.  
This approach exhibits two main limits if employed beyond technological applications; that is, to 
develop, instead, insights into the phenomenon of biological communication per se. In the first place, it 
does not provide criteria on the basis of which to distinguish communication from other types of specific 
molecular interactions such as ligand binding. In the second place, it relies on the notion of transfer of 
information from a sender to a receiver. This aspect is already problematic in itself, due to the set of 
heavy assumptions that the use of the concept of information carries. Yet it raises even more issues with 
regards to the possibility of implementing an information-based concept of communication applicable in 
synthetic biology. One issue that is particularly serious in this regard is how a signal should transmit 
semantic information. Attributing semantic representational capabilities to protocells and bacteria would 
introduce more problems than solutions, as it would ultimately require conceiving and designing 
biochemical mechanisms for the construction of internal semantic representations in these minimal 
systems. The model in question, however, does not address these issues, and the appeal to information 
actually remains mostly metaphorical, insofar as a precise characterisation in informational terms has not 
been provided for each step. The model can be explained instead in terms of molecular interactions alone, 
such as ligand binding, membrane receptor activation, and allosterically induced conformational change. 
The use of notions such as encoding and decoding does not seem to provide a deeper understanding of 
the processes investigated.  
A different type of synthetic approach to communication is provided by Rampioni et al.’s simplified 
model of a synthetic cell sending signals to a natural cell [11]. The model addresses communication in 
its full dimension as a biological and cognitive process. The underlying idea is to design protocells 
capable of sending signals and triggering responses in living cells (e.g., a bacterium). A mathematical 
model is proposed as a first step in this direction. It evaluates the feasibility of building a biochemical 
synthetic model (Figure 2(a)), by inserting in liposomes biomacromolecules capable of realising the 
necessary steps for the production of a signal molecule (e.g., N-acyl-homoserine lactones). This 
molecule, once sensed by the receptor of a natural cell, would in turn trigger processes of protein 
synthesis in the latter. In doing so, this approach explores the possibilities of a one-way interaction.  More 
specifically, it is aimed at the design of synthetic effector mechanisms capable of producing and releasing 
signals that trigger an actual change in the receiver cell.  
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Figure 5. (a) Simplified model of an artificial cell sending signals to a natural cell. The protocell synthetises a signal molecule 
S that can be sensed by a natural cell, and trigger protein synthesis (Redrawn, with minor modifications, from [11]. Details of 
the mechanims can be found in the original publication.). (b) Scheme of a synthetic approach to two-way communication 
between artificial and natural cells by means of quorum molecules (from [12], 
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acscentsci.6b00330, further permissions related to the figure should be directed to the ACS). 
While this second example specifically focuses on the feasibility of synthetic communication proceeding 
from synthetic to natural cells, a more recent model designed by Lentini et al. [12] attempts to realise 
(the conditions for) a two-way communication (Figure 2(b)). In this case, protocells are endowed with 
the capability to sense quorum molecules produced by bacteria. These molecules can cross the protocells’ 
compartment and activate transcriptional regulatory binding sites within the protocells. As a result, the 
activated protocells can produce other signal molecules, which are sensed by bacteria and can even 
interfere with quorum sensing mechanisms within bacterial communities. These protocells, therefore, 
can be considered as capable of establishing successful interactions with bacterial cells. 
Several comments should be made on these last two models, and more generally on the enterprise of 
using synthetic biology to investigate biological communication. The models satisfy the criteria of 
phenomenological and organisational relevance, and they do so by exhibiting successful interactive 
capabilities by means of biochemical regulatory mechanisms. The model proposed by Rampioni et al. 
focuses primarily on the effector dimension, while the other realises a whole sensory-effector 
mechanism. These interactions can be considered cognitive-like if interpreted through the lens of the 
theoretical framework of minimal cognition proposed in Section 2, as they realise sensory-effector 
mechanisms, but not self-maintenance.  
The fact that these models instantiate cognitive-like interactions, however, does not necessarily mean that 
they are realising that specific type of interactions that can be characterised as communication. This is 
where their main limit lies. In fact, not all cognitive interactions are instances of communication, but the 
models of protocells discussed in this section seem to fail to account for this crucial distinction. The 
theoretical framework adopted by Rampioni et al. [11], for example, is based on Maturana and Varela’s 
autopoietic theory, and more specifically on an account of communication understood as a “structural 
coupling” between autonomous systems [35]. On this basis, Rampioni et al. propose to study 
communication in synthetic biology by focusing on covariances between interacting entities: 
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“coordinated” or “coupled” behaviours resulting from dynamical processes of reciprocal perturbations 
and compensations, in which each system influences the behaviour of the other(s). 
However, this account seems too broad. Let us consider, for example, a predator-prey interaction. This 
well-known phenomenon follows an abstract pattern of mutual influences and compensations similar to 
the ones instantiated in the two examples of protocells discussed in this section: (1) a crouching lion 
looking at a gazelle starts running toward it, and in doing so produces an incidental sound; (2) the gazelle 
hears the sound, looks around, sees the lion, and starts running; (3) the lion starts chasing it; (4) the 
gazelle adjusts its course in response; (5) the lion in turn adjusts its course to the new path of the gazelle, 
and so on and so forth. The interacting dynamics of the two systems are coupled. They realise behavioural 
coordination, which involves cognitive capabilities and results from an interlocked triggering of changes 
of state between the systems involved. A similar pattern can occur at the intercellular level in phenomena 
that are closer to those modelled by synthetic approaches, for example between an amoeba predator and 
a bacterium.  
Clearly, these are not instances of communication. Yet the approaches adopted in the synthetic models 
of protocell-cell interactions discussed earlier in this section would not exclude these cases of 
noncommunicative coordinated behaviours. By lacking criteria to discriminate between different types 
of interactions, they seem to fail to address the specificity of the very phenomenon they should contribute 
to understanding, thus undermining their intended explanatory goals. In their current form, therefore, 
they might not be up to the task of specifically modelling biological communicative interactions.  
4. An Operational Approach to Communication: The Organisational-Influence 
Account 
Given the issues exhibited by the accounts discussed in the previous section, a new conceptual framework 
may be necessary to support the synthetic investigation of communication. A necessary step in this 
direction is to discuss what biological communication is and what types of phenomena and interactions 
it includes. The aim is to provide an operational account [8] capable of grounding and orienting 
theoretical and experimental research on communication in synthetic biology, and of offering guidelines 
for the evaluation of results. This account should be able to provide conceptual tools to discriminate 
between communicative and other cognitive interactions (demarcation requirement), and it should be 
applicable to those mechanisms and phenomena investigated by means of synthetic models 
(operationability requirement).  
It has been shown that communication does not include all types of interactions between minimally 
cognitive systems, and that it cannot be understood as merely “coordinated” or “coupled” behaviour. 
Predator-prey interactions, for example, are cases of coordinated behaviour but not of communication. 
Communication as information transfer is also a problematic criterion and difficult to apply in the context 
of synthetic biology. So how is it possible to characterise biological communication in such a way as to 
satisfy both demarcation and operationability requirements, and provide useful guidelines for the design 
and evaluation of synthetic models? 
There is another popular approach to communication that, although it requires some reframing, seems 
more suitable to be applied to the level of organisation that is relevant for synthetic biology and minimal 
life. It characterises communication as influence, and more specifically, functional influence [36, 37]. 
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The idea is that communication takes place when a signal emitted by a sender triggers a change in the 
behaviour of the receiver that is functional for the sender itself. In this perspective, in order for a system 
A to communicate with another system B by means of a signal S, it is necessary but not sufficient that S 
triggers a change of state in B. Additionally, it is necessary that emitting S has the biological function of 
triggering such changes of states in B. The functional dimension is essential. It is what allows us to 
distinguish proper signals from mere cues, and communication from other kinds of interactive 
phenomena such as a predator-prey system. The noise (S) made by the lion (A), in fact, triggers the 
escape of the gazelle (B). But it cannot be said to have the function of making the gazelle run away. 
The notion of communication as influence was introduced by Dawkins and Krebs [36] in an evolutionary 
framework according to which what is functional for the sender is interpreted in terms of adaptations: 
the signal is a functional trait because it allowed the ancestors of the sender to survive and to reproduce 
at a higher rate than other individuals lacking this trait. Indeed, biological functions have usually been 
understood in evolutionary terms, as naturally selected effects. However, if they are characterised in these 
terms, it follows from this approach that any complex interaction between organisms, “no matter how 
ritualized or similar to known cases of communication,” could not be considered to be an instance of 
communication unless its evolutionary history has been advanced [38]. Accordingly, when promoting 
the influence approach within the field of bacterial communication, Diggle and colleagues state: “When 
we see cell A produce a substance X that elicits a response in cell B, it is tempting to conclude that the 
substance produced is a signal. […] to demonstrate that substance X is a signal and not a cue, it is 
necessary to show that it evolved owing to the response it elicits.” [39, p. 1242]. 
Framed in this way, this notion has several limits. The question of what communication is and how it 
takes place in the currently observed systems is conceptually different from the question about how the 
communicative interaction originated in the first place. Yet this approach seems to conflate these two 
dimensions. Moreover, in current scientific practice, what most biologists are usually interested in is the 
current phenomenon of communication, rather than its evolutionary history, which is usually investigated 
only after the trait in question has been already described as a signal and the interaction that it mediates 
as an instance of communication. Most importantly, what is particularly problematic for the purposes of 
synthetic approaches is that the characterisation of communication as a product of natural selection rules 
out a priori the very possibility of an artificial, non-evolved communication system, making this 
approach useless in the context of synthetic biology. 
Despite all of these problems, however, the influence approach can be reframed and put to work as the 
conceptual and operational account that is currently missing in synthetic biology, and that is utterly 
required in order to support synthetic approaches to communication. In its most general form, the 
influence approach to communication states that a signal is some trait of the sender: (i) whose presence 
triggers some response in the receiver; and (ii) that has the function of triggering such a response. 
Although proponents of the influence approach have taken for granted an evolutionary understanding of 
biological functionality in terms of adaptation and natural selection (the influence approach is sometimes 
called “the adaptationist approach” [40]), this is not the only possibility. In fact, the influence approach 
can be reframed in terms of the current organisation of the system rather than in terms of evolutionary 
adaptations. This operation can be done by grounding the notion of functional influence into the 
organisational account of biological functions [41] (see also [42]), according to which a function is 
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understood as a contribution of a trait to the maintenance of an organisation (e.g., a living cell) that, in 
turn, contributes to producing and maintaining the trait itself. 
By adopting this account, the influence account of communication can be reformulated in organisational 
terms, in which to say that a signal is functional specifically means that it contributes to the maintenance 
of the current organisation of the sender, without necessarily appealing to its evolutionary history. In this 
view, communication in the most basic sense implies that: (i) a receiver responds to a signal emitted by 
the sender; and (ii) that a signal is a sender’s trait that by triggering some response in a receiver, 
contributes to maintaining the organization that, in turn, is responsible for producing and maintaining the 
signal trait itself. Operationally speaking, a process of communication is realised when the regulatory 
mechanisms of a system A are activated by specific features of their interaction with the environment 
and they modulate the internal dynamics of A. The regulated system A produces a signal S that triggers 
a regulatory action in a second system B, the receiver, that changes its own behaviour. The new behaviour 
of B, in turn, is functional for the sender in the sense that it contributes to the maintenance of A in the 
context that activated the regulatory action in the first place. In this scenario, the interaction between A 
and B can be said to be both cognitive, as it employs the sensory-effector regulatory mechanisms of each 
of the systems, and communicative, as it is functional for the sender A. In other words, communication 
relies on the cognitive (or cognitive-like) capabilities of both systems A and B. Yet, as an interactive 
cognitive phenomenon, it is realised in the more encompassing A-B dynamics. 
The organisational-influence account of communication has conceptual, theoretical and empirical virtues 
over the most salient alternatives. It is particularly suitable for applications in an experimental field such 
as synthetic biology, as it satisfies both operationability and demarcation requirements. Operationally 
speaking, being based on the notion of influence, this approach is free of the problems related to the 
application of the concept of information in this domain. It is also more parsimonious, insofar as it does 
not impose strong requirements for synthetic realisations, such as the design of specific mechanisms for 
the encoding, transmission, and decoding of information in protocells and artificial cells. It requires only 
the presence of regulatory sensors and effectors (organisational criterion of relevance), plus the fact that 
the systems engaged in communication should realise a certain pattern of interaction according to which 
the response to a signal is functional for the sender (phenomenological criterion of relevance).  
Moreover, this framework focuses on the features and behaviours of current systems, regardless of the 
remote historical evolutionary facts, and thus, it does not exclude a priori the possibility of non-evolved, 
artificially designed communication systems. For these reasons, this proposal can provide conceptual 
and heuristic guidelines for, and shed some light on, the present and future experimental work in synthetic 
biology, where the object of study is artificial systems, such as protocells, which are not the product of 
evolution.  
This theoretical framework does not consider the fact of being the result of evolution as a necessary 
condition for biological communication. Yet it does not exclude from the study of communication 
possible synthetic systems that would emerge as the result of artificial evolutionary techniques. It is not 
in contradiction with evolutionary accounts and it can also provide a theoretical grounding for functions 
and communication that can account also for those cases in which the interactions are the result of natural 
selection. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that the evolutionary account actually presupposes the 
existence of individual organisms that were able to survive and reproduce in their environment, and that 
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evolutionary adaptations depend on individual adaptive organisation [41-44]. The organisational 
framework specifically accounts for the capability of current systems to survive and reproduce in their 
environments. In this perspective, traits that are selected in the process of evolution are a subset of all the 
traits to which functions can be attributed in organisational terms. Having a framework that can ground 
communication without necessarily appealing to evolutionary history is important when the target of the 
investigation is the characterisation of the phenomenon of communication as it occurs (in the present). 
The cases of communication analysed in Section 3 are specifically focused on the study of current 
communicative interactions, and on designing systems that are capable of communicating. Their goal 
does not consist in producing these capabilities anew, each time, through artificial evolutionary processes 
subject to natural selection. However, although possible, the latter case would be very demanding in 
terms of time and resources and would actually respond to a different question: the evolutionary history 
of a communicative trait or system, rather than how communication works. 
At the same time, this proposal exhibits demarcating power, as it can distinguish signals from cues, so 
that it characterises as instances of communication only a proper subset of all coordinated behavioural 
interactions, excluding phenomena such as predator-prey interactions. According to this account, the fact 
that an artificial cell A produces a substance S that elicits a response R in a natural cell B is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for communication in the biological sense. Communication (and saying 
that substance S is a proper signal and not a cue) requires that S has the biological function of triggering 
the response R in B. More specifically, this implies that: (i) A is a self-maintaining system and self-
producing autonomous systems; and (ii) R (the receiver’s response triggered by S) is functional for A; 
that is, it contributes to the maintenance of A. 
5. Discussion: A Change of Perspective 
This paper addressed the issue of how to investigate minimal cognitive properties and phenomena in 
synthetic biology. It analysed its requirements, and the theoretical and epistemological tools available. 
One of the most promising lines of research in this scenario, it has been shown, is constituted by the 
synthetic modelling of biological communication, which explores the possibilities offered by protocells 
interacting with living cells.  
By analysing the current theoretical scenario and three examples of synthetic models of communication, 
it has been shown that a precise account of communication able to capture the specificity of this 
phenomenon, and that is capable of distinguishing it from other types of cognitive interactions, is needed. 
Considering that explicit or implicit conceptual frameworks play an important role in the identification 
and design of the interactive dynamics to be investigated, the lack of a precise framework may have 
negative consequences, seriously affecting the scope and explanatory power of synthetic models.  
To solve this issue, a theoretical account of communication as influence has been proposed: the 
organisational-influence account. It can be operationalised into synthetic models by realising systems 
endowed with regulatory mechanisms and capable of functionally influencing one another. The adoption 
of this framework has several implications for the modelling of communicative interactions, ultimately 
entailing a change of perspective. 
In the first place it enhances the specificity of models. It provides criteria that allow narrowing down the 
object of investigation to that subset of cognitive or cognitive-like interactions that are relevant for the 
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study of the phenomenon of biological communication, and putting them into focus. This is something 
that other theoretical frameworks seem to fail to achieve. According to this perspective, to study 
communication it is necessary to look for how the sender of a signal influences the behaviour of the 
receiver in such a way that the receiver, in turn, contributes to the viability of the sender. The focus, 
therefore, is on those interactions between senders and receivers that are functional for the senders. 
In the second place, this conceptual shift requires complexifying the models available, through the 
establishment of a specific type of functional loop of interactions that proceeds from the sender to the 
receiver and back to the sender. This type of loop differs from the interaction schemes realised in the 
models developed by Rampioni et al. [11] and Lentini et al. [12], and analysed in Section 3. These latter 
models rely mainly on linear interactions, in which a system affects another: from senders (protocells) to 
receivers (cells) in the first one, and with the additional capability of senders (protocells) to sense the 
medium in the second one (an environment-sender-receiver interaction). The main objective of these 
models is to realise successful interactions that trigger a response in the receiver. Yet, in their current 
form, they do not take into consideration the functional relationship that is characteristic of 
communication as a biological phenomenon, and they cannot differentiate it from other even very 
complex interactions, such as those occurring in the dynamics of a predator chasing prey.  
In the third place, from the operational point of view, to realise synthetic models of communication 
understood as an influence exerted between artificial and natural cells, it is possible to proceed in two 
ways: with either cells or protocells as senders, respectively. In the first case, the focus is on how a cell 
can functionally influence a protocell. Models would need to employ protocells that can respond to 
signals emitted by cells. However, rather than just trigger a reaction in the receiver, the signal should 
change the behaviour of the protocell in such a way as to contribute to the maintenance of the sender 
cells. This functional response by the protocell may be achieved, for example, by releasing a useful 
protein that the cell is missing, or a metabolite not available in the environment.  
The second approach takes protocells as senders. It allows exploring specific aspects of communication, 
or communication-like phenomena, by investigating how protocells can influence the behaviour of 
natural cells in a way that can be considered somehow functional for the protocell, despite the fact that 
the latter is not capable of achieving full-fledged metabolic self-maintenance. A possibility can be to 
modify the behaviour of the receiver cells in such a way as to contribute to making the protocell more 
stable in a given environment (e.g., by providing different types of membrane components), or to enable 
new functions (e.g., by providing new enzymes and metabolites that can be employed by the protocell to 
perform new operations).  
However, the possibilities opened by synthetic models are not restricted to interactions between natural 
cells and protocells. For example, an additional line of investigation, of special interest for the origins of 
life, could be to explore the range and possibilities offered by the communication-like loops between 
protocells in a prebiotic environment, without involving living cells.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
The adoption of a theoretical account, such as the organisational-influence one, that can be 
operationalised by employing and redesigning already available protocells with sensory-effector 
capabilities, can provide a conceptual and heuristic guideline for the investigation of biological 
 14 
 
communication and of its minimal instances. By making explicit the distinctive features of 
communicative phenomena, it provides tools and criteria to reframe the interactive dynamics between 
natural and artificial cells in order to model behaviours that are relevant for understanding the nature and 
roots of biological communication. In particular, this approach puts into evidence the necessity for 
modellers to shift their attention from designing protocells that can interact with cells, to protocells that 
can participate in functional loops with cells or among themselves.  
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